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On 8 June 1967 the U.S.S. Liberty, a U.S. Navy signal intercept ship cruising in international 
waters off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula, took fire from Israeli warplanes and torpedo boats. 
The attack occurred midway through what would become known as the Six Day War, at a point 
when Israel had pushed deep into the Sinai, and resulted in over 100 American casualties 
including 34 dead. 
 
It also raised plenty of questions. Liberty survivors and others have disputed the conclusions that 
the attack was an accident, as Israel has held,[1] or at worst an act of gross negligence, as a 
recently released U.S. report indicates.[2] Theories abound claiming that Israel intended to target 
the Liberty, either to draw the United States into the war by sinking her and laying blame on the 
United Arab Republic, or to prevent the interception of Israeli communications. 
 
In response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in July 2003, the National Security 
Agency (NSA) released a handful of declassified documents pertaining to the incident.[3] Most 
prominent among these documents are approximately 59 minutes of transmissions, in the form of 
audio recordings and accompanying English transcripts, between a ground controller near Tel 
Aviv and two Israeli rescue helicopters dispatched after the attack. These are said to be the only 
audio captured in the period immediately before, during or after the attack. Also released were 
two reports published the day after the incident summarizing the pertinent sections of the audio, 
and a 1981 internal NSA report discussing in detail the attack, Israel's findings from its own 
investigation, the conclusions reached by the NSA, and lessons learned by the intelligence 
community for protecting assets in danger zones.[4] 
 
The problem with conspiracy theories is that they exist very comfortably in a vacuum — the less 
information one way or the other, the better — and the NSA documents leave some gaps in the 
information. Two isolated sections of the transcripts — one indicating the Israelis may have had 
advance knowledge of the nationality of those aboard the ship, the other raising questions over 
whether the fighter pilots really could not see the American flag the Liberty crew says they were 
flying — have sparked fresh attacks from critics and have received most of the (limited) coverage 
in the mainstream press.[5] One other section, concerning the mistaken identification of the 
Liberty as an Egyptian cargo ship, contradicts the 1981 report, thereby raising more questions.  
 
The analysis below draws primarily on those sections of the audio, suggests a few alternative 
explanations based on the 1981 report and other sources, and tries to sum up the state of the 
evidence provided in the documents. 
"If they speak English…" 
Just after 1200Z on 8 June, Israeli fighters strafed the Liberty, followed 15 minutes later by 
torpedoes from the Israeli Navy. No recordings or transcripts of communication before or during 
the attack have been released, if they exist at all. The NSA audio files pick up at 1229Z with the 
dispatch of the helicopters. At approximately 1234Z, within five minutes of liftoff and well before 
they had reached the smoking ship, the Israeli helicopter pilots were informed the ship was 
identified as Egyptian and were instructed to turn back.  
 
 
"Pay attention: the ship has now been identified as an Egyptian ship. You are returning home." [6]  
 
Three minutes later, after the controller is in contact with superiors (judging from the spans of 
radio silence), the helicopters were sent out once again to look for survivors. Shortly thereafter 
came an additional clarification: the ship was an Egyptian cargo vessel.  
 
These two declarations of the ship's identity are suddenly undermined at 1259Z, with the 
choppers still en route, when the controller gave very specific instructions to the pilots to learn the 
nationality of the first survivor pulled from the water, followed a few minutes later by further 
instructions — bring survivors to different locations depending on the language they spoke: 
 
 
"As soon as you begin picking up men, find out from the first man that you pick up what his 
nationality is, and report it to us right away.  
It is important that ((we)) know." [7]  
 
 
"Pay attention: Those who speak… if they speak Arabic, Egyptians, you're taking them to Al-
'Arish. If they speak English, non-Egyptians, you're taking them to Lod. Is that clear?" [8]  
 
Israel might be expected to separate combatants based on their nationality, but the fact that the 
dispatcher specifically indicated English-speakers is of great interest. While it is true that many 
Arabs involved in the war — from Jordan, from Kuwait, from Egypt — understand or even speak 
English, it is highly doubtful that the controller was indicating the pilots might find other Arabs. If 
non-Egyptian Arabs were on-board, why would they speak English if captured by the Israelis? 
 
This order from ground control is at the heart of many critics' belief that the true and entire story 
of the Liberty has not been revealed. The statement indicates that the Israelis knew they might 
find Americans, not Arabs, at the wreckage site, leading to the assumption that Israel knew 
before this point that it had hit a non-Egyptian vessel. This is probably true but, given the small 
slice of the scene available through these documents, we cannot say how far in advance this was 
known or which Israeli authorities knew the identity of the American ship. 
 
All that we can say for sure is that the Israeli military operators were confused. Several reports at 
the time indicate the Israelis were figuring out their mistake as the helicopters were approaching 
the wreck — as Roman characters became visible on the ships' bow, or as a torpedo boat crew 
sighted a life vest inscribed with "U.S. Navy" shortly after the torpedoes struck.[9] The ground 
controller's initial declaration that it was an Egyptian cargo ship was straightforward and 
emotionless while later broadcasts became more strained: possibly the controller began to 
suspect an unanticipated problem based on the conflicting information he was being told to pass 
along.[10] 
Raise what's left of the flag for me 
The second major point of contention in these intercepts involves the American flag flying from 
the Liberty's mast. The pilots and boat crews that attacked the Liberty all testified repeatedly that 
they could not see the flag, hence their tragic mistake. The U.S. Navy meanwhile claims the flag 
was always flying from the mast, although they concede it might have been difficult for the Israeli 
torpedo crews to observe it through the smoke from the air attack. 
But what of the planes that fired those initial salvos? The first reports indicated that the planes did 
not circle or otherwise perform observation runs before strafing the Liberty. A U.S. seaman 
wounded in the attack echoed this position, stating the planes came upon the ship and started 
firing so quickly that they took the crew completely by surprise.[11] However, these first reports 
were contradicted by the commander of the Liberty and an Israeli sailor aboard one of the 
torpedo boats, among others.[12] Both said the planes circled several times before opening fire 
and this is the version included in all official accounts of the incident, both Israeli and 
American.[13]  
 
The weather on 8 June was clear, the Liberty's own weather log indicates the flag was flying,[14] 
and we know the first chopper pilot on the scene was able to see the ensign. While his initial 
transmission apparently was radioed back on an alternate channel, the NSA files do capture the 
ground control response at 1312Z: 
 
"Roger, understand. Did you clearly identify an America flag? 
… 
They request that you make another pass and check once again 
whether it is really an American flag."[15]  
 
The fighter pilots would appear to be lying. Yet the plot grows still thicker: The Israeli sailor noted 
above reported the helicopter pilot as saying to the torpedo boat crews: "they are raising an 
American flag," (emphasis added) indicating it was not being flown prior to the chopper's 
arrival.[16] But this statement is far from conclusive since, in addition to it being hearsay, the 
Liberty crew reported seeing their flag shot down during the attack and, at first opportunity, ran 
the "holiday ensign" — the largest flag aboard — up the mast.[17]  
The El-Kasir  
Despite early media accounts that the Liberty bore an unfortunate resemblance to an Egyptian 
cargo vessel, the El-Kasir, the 1981 report indicates much greater differences between the two 
ships: 
 
"The El-Kasir was approximately one-quarter of the Liberty's tonnage, about one-half its length, 
and offered a radically different silhouette."[18]  
 
The supposed similarity in color, silhouette, and other features was a major piece of evidence for 
the Israelis. Two different commanders attached to the torpedo boats reportedly came to 
independent identifications of the Liberty as the El-Kasir, thereby giving some justification to their 
hasty actions. These identifications almost certainly were behind ground control's declarations 
that the Liberty was an Egyptian container ship.  
 
"For your information, it is apparently an Arab ship…it is an Egyptian supply ship."[19]  
The case for error 
None of the three questionable sections above makes a substantive case for malicious intent on 
the part of the Israelis, although in re-reading them this author must admit to some increased 
suspicion. If anything, the transcripts make a case for innocuous error, not malicious intent: 
nothing particularly surprising is heard, and the voices of all involved indicate they are reacting to 
changing information rather than following a pre-arraigned plan.[20] 
 
The Israeli inquiry at the time found no reasons to charge any Israelis with negligence in the 
attack, heaping on a number of reasons why the tragic error occurred. The key word would be 
tragic: the Israelis saw the attack as stemming from a series of missteps and unfortunate 
confusion that could not have been avoided.[21] 
 
The 1981 NSA report is less charitable, taking the same arguments for error — the confusion 
onshore by Israeli troops who thought they were being shelled from the sea; the failure of the 
Liberty to identify itself after the initial air attack; etc. — and concluding that the inquiry "reveal[ed] 
egregious errors in both command judgments and operational procedures."[22] At the same time, 
the report concludes by acknowledging the possible motivations for a purposeful Israeli strike 
against a U.S. ship, and then writes them off as unfounded and unsupported by the signal data 
available.  
 
The section above is found in the Gerhard and Millington report and is taken verbatim from 
Israel's initial inquiry. The Israelis found no on to be at fault in the matter for reasons including 
those summarized in this excerpt.[23]  
Conclusions 
Of the three issues raised by the audio transcripts — the nationalities of survivors, the position of 
the Liberty's flag, and the Liberty's supposed similarity to an Egyptian cargo ship — the jumble of 
flag positions (up, down, or on its way up) is perhaps the least settled aspect of the incident. The 
main question is whether or not the Israeli jets could or did see the flag when they circled the 
Liberty. All the evidence that the flag was flying comes from U.S. reports, while everything that 
might lead us to believe the flag was either not flying or just not visible (this was a smaller flag 
than the one run up late in the attack, and we have no clear record of whether the wind was 
blowing at the time of attack) comes from the Israelis. This is not an issue that can be resolved 
even with the newly declassified information at hand. 
 
It is also not certain what the statements about bringing English-speaking survivors to Lod 
suggest. Perhaps all they indicate is that there was some reason to suspect the ship carried 
Westerners prior to the helicopters' arrival at the scene. Whether that reason was present ten 
minutes or a day ahead of the transmission cannot be determined. However, the related reports 
of Israelis holding their fire mid-attack, likely in reaction to viewing the Roman characters on the 
ship's side and the U.S. Navy flotsam reported at the scene, lends more credence to the former. 
 
The El-Kasir confusion is more difficult to sort out. Despite the flat dismissal in the 1981 NSA 
report, the two ships do bear some resemblance, mostly in that their towers are located mid-ship 
and both have a plentitude of aerials, winches and other tall, slender devices protruding from both 
decks. It is possible, although unlikely given the clear afternoon on which the attack occurred, that 
the ships could be mistaken for one another from a distance. Removing this piece of evidence 
from the puzzle, however, does not leave us with a strong case for an intentional Israeli attack. Its 
inclusion increases the credibility through circumstance, not hard evidence. Moreover the excuse 
"we thought it was another ship we knew was in the area," sounds like the sort of thing produced 
by the military as a cover story when a mistake has been made — similar to the highly 
transparent statements that the Liberty was not spying on anyone.[24]  
 
Other signal intelligence gathered on 8 June, but processed days later, did not reveal anything 
about a forthcoming attack. In fact, despite identifying and occasionally monitoring 22 different 
frequencies used by the Israelis in the day leading up to the attack, there was no indication that 
something was afoot.[25] This, along with the alternate explanations and/or lack of consensus for 
the suspicious sections above, leads to three possible conclusions: 
1. The attack on the Liberty unfolded as described in Israeli and U.S. reports, with mistakes 
and zeal leading to tragedy. 
2. If there is more to this story, it cannot be found in the material declassified by the NSA. 
Anything further would have to exist in Israeli records, including the confidential 
statements made to the State Department in the days following the attack, or in 
recordings or transcripts — if they exist — of alternative communication frequencies of 
which U.S. signal intelligence was unaware or unable to decode. 
3. Related to this second possibility: the Israelis managed to pull off one of the better 
conspiracies in modern times, successfully orchestrating dozens of officers and probably 
hundreds of enlisted men in a silent plan, and then had absolutely no one spill the beans.  
Of these, the first explanation seems most plausible. As described above, most of the "facts" in 
this case could be argued either way. The Israelis were negligent or overzealous to be sure, but 
to prove anything more requires leaps of faith and a deep cynicism in the official reports from all 
sides. It is also susceptible to basic questions about Israeli motivations. Why, if the Israelis intent 
was to get rid of a spying vessel or drag the United States into the war, did they not finish sinking 
the ship? Why did they not only hold their fire, but also offer help afterwards?[26]  
 
The NSA releases, despite covering an entire 59 minutes, provide an incomplete picture of the 
attack. There are no transcripts or recordings of any communications before or during the attack 
and nothing from the Israeli boats at the scene. Furthermore, sections of these declassified 
documents are scrubbed, whited out in the transcripts and deleted from the audio. Some of these 
deletions seem to be references to communication channel numbers and other data that should 
remain classified, but at points entire paragraphs are missing. 
 
None of this is intended to imply dirty-dealings on the part of any of the parties involved. Even if 
the transcripts were complete, or more extensive, it is quite possible that they would not reveal 
much more of interest. One would not expect two rescue pilots and a ground controller to be 
involved in, or even aware of, any plans to purposely strike a U.S. ship. In fact, we can infer that 
those Israelis who are caught on the NSA intercepts were most definitely out of the loop. As the 
helicopters were heading out, ground control contacted other forces, probably the torpedo boats 
on scene or a commander, and received confirmation that the ship was not firing back and did not 
fire when fired upon — an indication that it was safe for the helicopters to proceed.[27] Yet 
reports from the U.S. and Israeli Navies specifically note the Liberty firing at least at the 
torpedoes launched against her, if not at the torpedo boats themselves.[28]  
 
The newly declassified records reveal confusion on the part of all involved as to the nationality of 
the vessel, and far too much carelessness on the part of the Israeli military. However, like the 
absence of records from the Tokyo war crimes trials and the sealed JFK files, a paucity of 
evidence is fertile ground for supposition and conspiracy theories. The lack of facts becomes the 
facts themselves. Supporters of the official conclusions, that the attack was accidental, will find 
nothing in the newly released information to counter their belief. Conspiracy theorists should look 
elsewhere for less flimsy threads upon which to hang their arguments. 
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues see our Strategic Insights
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.navy.mil with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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